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GOVERNMENT BY AN UNACCOUNTABLE
PRIVATE NON PROFIT CORPORATION
Paul A. Simmons*
L Foreword and Statement of Purpose
This article will address and analyze the tremendous
unfettered, unaccountable power of the elitist, privately controlled,
non-profit corporation; the American Law Institute (hereinafter ALI).1
In effect, the ALI legislates, changes, and interprets the common law
of this nation without obtaining any input from Congress and/or the
state legislatures, without obtaining input from the broad-based
representative interests of the masses of ordinary citizens, and without
giving any meaningful consideration of any kind to the social,
economic, and political interests of the various minority groups in
this country.'
Since 1923, the common law of this nation has been reformed
and promulgated by a private organization, the American Law
* Senior United States district court judge for the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania (now inactive).
' The ALI was incorporated on February 23, 1923, by William H. Taft, Charles E.
Hughes, Elihu Root, Constantine J. Smyth, Walter I. McCoy, Peyton Gordon, and
George T. Weitzel. THE AmM cAN LAW INSTITUTE ANNUAL REPORTS 47 (1991)
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORTS]. The purposes of the ALI were stated in its Certificate
of Incorporation: "The particular business and objects of the society are educational, and
are to promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to
social needs, to secure the better administration of justice, and to encourage and carry
on scholarly and scientific legal work." Id.
2 See infra notes 76-89 and accompanying text. See also George L. Priest, Strict
Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 2301, 2301 (1989),
reprinted in 39 DEF. L.J. 279, 283 (1990) (stating that the ALI Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 402A initiated a revolutionary change in tort law that "was accomplished by
a set of lawyers and, more narrowly, by law teachers, rather than by more democratic
law making bodies."). The "law teachers" referred to were official Restatement
reporters employed by the ALI. Priest, supra, at 2304.
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Institute.' The ALI's operational structure is entirely foreign to and
antithetical to our nation's democratic principles of participatory and
representative government. Thus, it is necessary that the structure be
reformed to conform to the democratic representative principles of
government which this nation was built upon.
The great anomaly in the creation and operation of the ALI
is that the ALI's de facto founders, two of whom were distinguished
law professors of the leading law schools at the time,4 created a
closed, undemocratic, organization to reform the common law of the
United States of America because these professors did not trust the
task of reforming the common law to the non-academic legal
practitioners.5  Nor did the ALI's de facto founders trust the
collective wisdom of the 'common' people of this nation in reforming
the common law, as the same would have been exemplified by reform
legislation created and passed by the duly elected federal and state
3 See N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of
the American Law Institute, 8 LAW & HIST. REv. 55 (1990) (William Draper Lewis'
purpose in directing the ALl for more than two decades, was progressive, pragmatic
reform of the law, and his triumph was the inclusion of the leading lawyers and judges
of his day to this goal).
I ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 47. William H. Taft was Kent Professor of
Constitutional Law at Yale University. 18 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOORAPHY 270
(Dumas Malone ed. 1936). Constantine J. Smyth was Associate Dean and professor at
Creighton University Law School and a professor at Georgetown University College of
Law. WHOWAS WHO IN AMERICA 1152 (3d prtg. 1943).
5 See Hull, supra note 3, at 59. Hull quotes a speech made by Professor Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, then of Yale Law School, and later of Harvard Law School, at the
1914 annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS):
Practicing lawyers are, as a class, too busy with their individual
problems and the earning of a livelihood to give the necessary time
and energy to the broadest aspect and problems of the legal system.
Furthermore, they are not so apt to have the detached and
disinterested viewpoint that would ordinarily characterize a university
law faculty; and we know that only too many lawyers of low
standards are apt to think that existing defects mean more litigation
and hence more earnings to themselves and as a result no longer
have the complete confidence of the great masses of the public.
Id. (quoting Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, A Vital School of Jurisprudence, 14 AsS'N OF
AM. L. SCH. HANDBOOK 76, 108 (1913-16)).
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representatives."
This article does not advocate the rejection of the ALI
publications, even though they were formulated in an undemocratic
fashion. As a practical matter, this system has continued for too long
to reexamine it in its entirety and rework the ALI's massive
restatement of the common law. All of the state and federal courts
have been co-opted by the ALI7 and these courts have cited the ALI
Restatements with approval over 143,737 times.8
This article presents an important challenge to the organized
bar, to Congress, and to the several state legislatures of this country,
to open their eyes and stand up for the democratic process. This
article is an invitation to legal bodies to cease their complete
capitulation to the ALI's elitist practice of reforming the common law
of this nation in its own style, while completely excluding almost
every citizen in the nation, including over 99.9% of the nation's
attorneys, from participating in the reformation process.9
6 See Hull, supra note 3, at 63. Professor Hull quotes from the Association of
American Law Schools presidential speech made by Professor Joseph Beale of Harvard
Law School as follows:
As long as our doors were entered chiefly by immigrants of cognate
blood, the common law as it was studied by Story and Langdell
might safely be left to develop and adapt itself to each changed
condition. But within the last twenty years a horde of alien races
from Eastern Europe and from Asia has been pouring in on us,
accustomed to absolute government, accustomed to hate the law, and
hostile above all to all wealth and power. As these men accept the
citizenship which is almost thrust upon them by politicians desirous
of their votes, they take their place among the forces which must in
the long run determine the nature of the law.
Id. (quoting Joseph Beale, The Necessity for a Study ofLegal System, 14 ASS'N OF AM.
L. ScH. HANDBOOK 33-34'(1913-16)).
7 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 15 for a breakdown of state and federal
courts' adoption of ALl Restatements and Codifications.
8 Id.
9 The organization is controlled by a council of 56 persons, 34 of whom are
graduates of two law schools, Harvard and Yale. See infra Appendix One, at 99, for
a listing of ALI members and the law schools attended. The President of the ALI for
the last 12 years has been Roswell B. Perkins, a 1949 graduate of Harvard Law School.
9 MARTINDALE HUBBEL 614B (N.Y. ed. 1990). Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., a professor
at Yale Law School and a 1954 graduate of Columbia Law School, is the executive
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The original incorporators of the ALl have ingeniously and
unilaterally compromised both the state and the federal judicial
system by incorporating the entire leadership personnel into the
participating membership activities of the ALI by gratuitously
conferring automatic voting and participating memberships on
virtually every important judicial leader in the entire judiciary system
of the United States."° This was done without obtaining any official
consent or permission from any branch of any state or federal
government, and without obtaining the prior consent of any of the
affected judicial officials.
Numerous judges who are active voting ex officio members
of the ALI simultaneously participate as quasi-legislators in
publishing new statements of various rules of law, restatements of
various rules of law, suggested codifications of various rules of law,
model codes of law, and other related work." Unfortunately, some
of these same judges, while acting in their judicial capacity,
frequently adopt the ALI construction given to the relevant rule of
law. Often, the ALI construction of the relevant rule of law had been
pre-approved by these judges in their capacity as ALI members, even
though in some cases the ALI construction of the relevant rule is at
variance with and different from the common law. " The ALI version
of a relevant rule of law is often the mere reflection of the legal
philosophy of the ALI reporter (a law professor) as to what the
relevant rule of law should be." Often the adopted ALI rule does not
reflect what the relevant rule of law would have been if the matter
director. 3 MARTINDALE HUBBEL 193 (1990).
10 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 115-47 (providing a complete membership
list of the ALl).
" For an inclusive description of the ALI ex officio active voting members,
including 385 judges, see ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 115-47.
12 Two examples of ALl member appellate judges adopting sections of the ALI
Restatement of applicable law and at the same time specifically rejecting English and
American Common Law applicable to the matter are Campagnie Des Bauxites De
Guinee v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 724 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1983) (the "Tippler-
Crusher" case) and Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
No. 83-5476 (3d Cir. 1984) (the "Bucket-Wheel" case). See infra notes 105-17 and
accompanying text.
13 Cf infra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the procedure for preparing
restatements of the law).
[V/ol. X
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had been the subject of public hearings with input from a broad-based
citizen constituency with public debate, and with final action required
to be taken by legislators who are directly accountable to their
general public constituency.14
When a relatively small number of judges are permitted to act
simultaneously as quasi-legislators and judicial officers in matters
involving the same subject matter without being held accountable to
the public, there is a clear violation of the separation of powers
doctrine implicit in our form of democratic government.15 Judges
should not be permitted to avoid the checks and balances of the
legislative and executive branches of government exemplified by the
constitutional doctrine of "separation of powers" which are so
essential to the preservation of a free and democratic society in the
United States of America.1" It is the position of this paper that sitting
14 See infra note 76.
'5 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power To... make
all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.") with U.S. CONST. art. III, §
1 ("The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").
See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (discussing separation of
powers between the legislative and judicial branches in the context of judicial review of
legislative action).
16 See WALTER B. WIRisToN, RISK AND OTHER FouR LETTER WoRDs 45-46 (1986)
(discussing separation of powers).
By what route have we arrived at this danger point for
human freedom? If we look closely at where we are now in our
national journey, I think it can be argued that, almost without being
aware of it, we have ignored the basic intention of the Founding
Fathers to achieve a fair and equitable government through the
checks and balances prescribed in the Constitution. The constitutions
of some of the original states, notably those of Virginia, Maryland,
and Massachusetts, provided specifically for the separation of powers
between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.
The separation-of-powers concept was nailed to the mast
by John Adams in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780:
In the government of this commonwealth, the
legislative department shall never exercise the
executive and judicial powers, or either of them;
the executive shall never exercise the legislative
72 JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. X
judges should be barred from participating in all ALI activities and/or
any similar quasi-legislative activity.
IL The ALl is Controlled by a Carefully Selected Group of
People Who Attempt to State, Restate, Reformulate,
and Codify the Common Law
The ALI was established under the laws of the District of
Columbia as a non-profit corporation on February 23, 1923, by seven
powerful and important men.17  Three of the ALI incorporators
deserve a brief comment. The leading incorporator was William
Howard Taft, a graduate of Cincinnati Law School class of 1880,
twenty-seventh President of the United States (1909-1913), and the
then Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court (1921-1930). "
Another important incorporator at that period in time was Charles
Evans Hughes, a graduate of Columbia Law School class of 1884,
who became Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court and
and judicial powers, or either of them; the
judicial shall never exercise the legislative and
executive powers, or either of them; to the end
that it may be a government of laws and not of
men.
That may sound tedious, but its clarity is classic. The
framers of the U.S. Constitution incorporated that basic doctrine,
though not in so doctrinaire of form. In the Federalist Papers,
James Madison said with emphasis that the separation, though not
absolute, must be observed.
Current practice violates not only the letter but the spirit of
the principle. We have ignored John Locke's dictum that "the
legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other
hands, for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who
have it cannot pass it over to others."
id. (emphasis added). For a general but thorough discussion of the legal problems and
cases raised with regard to separation of powers, see HENRY HART & HERBERT
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 868-69; 925-27; 928-30;
932-34; 946-50 (3d ed. 1988). See also MARTIN A. REDISH, FEDERAL COURTS 130-73
(2d ed. 1989).
17 ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 47.
18 JOSEPH N. KANE, FACTS ABOUT THE PRESIDENTs 160 (1989); LEO PFEFFER, THIS
HONORABLE COURT 269, 273, 279 (1965).
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served in that capacity from 1930 to 1941.19 The ALI incorporation
papers were also signed by a then-leading member of the nation's bar
and an outstanding statesman, Elihu Root, a graduate of New York
University Law School class of 1867.20
The announced purposes of the American Law Institute were
as follows:
The purposes of the. Institute shall be those
stated in its Certificate of Incorporation, namely:
The particular business and objects of the
society are educational, and are to promote the
clarification and simplification of the law and its
better adaptation to social needs, to secure better
administration of justice, and to encourage and carry
on scholarly and scientific legal work.
The Institute shall be operated exclusively for
said purposes. It shall not be operated for profit, and
no part of its assets or net earnings shall inure to the
benefit of any member or private individual.
No part of the activities of the. Institute shall
be carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting
to influence legislation other than through making
available the results of nonpartisan analysis, study or
research; provided, however, the Institute may appear
before, or communicate with, any legislative body
with respect to a possible decision of such body which
might affect the existence of the Institute, its powers
and duties, its tax exempt status, or the deduction of
contributions to it. The Institute shall not participate
'9 SAMUEL HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT 3, 91
(1951); LEO PFEFFER, THIS HONORABLE COURT 253 (1965).
2' WHO WAS WHO IN AMERICA 1056 (3d prtg. 1943). The other four incorporators
were: Constantine J. Smyth, admitted to the practice of law in 1885 in the state of
Nebraska, Associate Dean of Creighton Law School. Id. at 1152. Walter I. McCoy,
graduate of Harvard Law School, class of 1886. Id. at 805. George T. Weitzel,
graduate of Harvard Law School, class of 1897. Id. Peyton Gordon, graduate of
Columbia University Law School, received L.L.B in 1890 and L.L.M in 1891. 2 WHO
WAS WHO IN AMERICA 215 (1950).
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in, or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements) any political campaign on
behalf of any candidate for public office.21
Actually, the "purposes" are achieved in the mechanical sense
(as distinguished from the philosophical sense) by the ALI's
sponsoring of the writing and publication of a series of printed
volumes on various legal subjects in the law. These subjects include
the Restatement of the Law,22 Codification of the Law,23 and a
number of learned papers wherein the ALI Restatements of Law and
other ALI publications are cited'as legal authority in the course of
litigating various cases and controversies in the courts.'
Through March 1, 1991, the Restatements of Agency,
Conflict of Laws, Contracts, Foreign Relations Law, Judgments,
Property, Restitution, Security, Torts, and Trusts were cited with
approval by state and federal courts in all fifty states and Puerto Rico
in approximately 114,451 cases.2" Similarly, through March 1, 1991,
ALT Codifications such as the Model Penal Code and the Uniform
Commercial Code have been cited with approval by state and federal
courts in all states and Puerto Rico in approximately 29,286 cases.26
These numbers illustrate the tremendous impact the various
publications of the ALI has had on the revision and growth of the
21 ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 49.
2 Restatement of Law is defined as
[a] series of volumes authored by the American Law Institute that
tell what the law in a general area is, how it is changing, and what
direction the authors (who are leading scholars in each field covered)
think this change should take; for example Restatement of the Law
of Contracts; Restatement of the Law of Torts.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1313 (6th ed. 1990).
' Codification is defined as "[t]he process of collecting and arranging systematically,
usually by subject, the laws of a state or country, or the rules and regulations covering
a particular area or subject of law or practice ... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 258
(6th ed. 1990).
24 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 15.
25 Id.
26 id.
[Vol. X
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common law in the United States. 27
See Nicholas Wolfson, The Theoretical and Empirical Failing oftheAmericanLaw
Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, in THE AmERiCAN LAW INSTITUTE AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 69 (Phillip D. Mink, Esq. ed.,
National Legal Center for the Public Interest 1987).
[The ALl] is a private organization of distinguished practitioners and
corporate law professors that over the years has generated a series
of very influential Restatements of the Law. These massive works
attempt to coherently synthesize what was considered to be the best
elements in the legal doctrine on a given topic. They do not
constitute or represent to be scientific empirical studies of data. The
governing Council of the Institute approved a project on the structure
and governance of the business corporation in May 1978. A small
group of Reporters - all except one are past or present members of
law school faculties - were appointed to draft the proposals. As is
usual, a larger group of Consultants and Advisers were appointed to
guide the Reporters. The overwhelming percentage of the group
were attorneys, law professors, or judges rather than social scientists
such as economists. The first product of the Reporters was Tentative
Draft No. 1 dated 1982. The draft was severely criticized by
representatives of the bar and publicly held corporations. One of the
results of that criticism was that the subtitle of the Project was
altered from Restatement and Recommendations to Analysis and
Recommendations. The changes were made to "allay the fear that
courts might be misled by the traditional word 'Restatement' in the
title to view the entire document as purporting to restate existing
law." The title alteration was designed to make clear that the
Institute was proposing significant changes in the law, not merely
recodifying existing law. These policy modifications were made,
however, without any effort to organize a scientific examination of
the dynamics of board behavior. At the outset, the ALl Reporters
simply adopted one view of the board, the monitoring theory (i.e.,
the board is a remote censor of corporate conduct) and went with it.
Since then, (as we discuss below) they have been in retreat from the
original extreme formulation of a passive board oversight function.
This is not the first time that the ALl made this kind of
serious error of omission. In its earlier codification and
reformulation of the federal securities laws, the ALl Reporter and his
Consultants and Advisers made the same serious error. They made
policy change after policy change in the securities laws without any
effort to engage in scientific research into real world phenomena.
The ALl proposals on the securities laws have never been introduced
into the Congress and appear dead. However, the ALl Corporate
Governance Project can have an impact simply by being written.
For example, in 1983 an Iowa court adopted as good law a
76 JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. X
It is clear that the ALI Bylaws make the ALI Council the
controlling authority in all of the most vital and important affairs of
the ALI.28 The Bylaws and "Rules of Council" permit the present
officers and Council to perpetuate themselves in office for many
years into the foreseeable future.29 The ALI Council, consisting of
fifty-six persons, is the operating organ of the ALI.3" The general
powers of the ALl Council read as follows:
1. The affairs of the Institute, including the
investment and disposition of its funds and property,
shall be managed by the Council, which is authorized
to make rules not inconsistent with the Bylaws.
Without limitation upon the generality of that
authority, the Council shall have the power:
a. To determine projects and
programs to be undertaken by the
Institute, either for the Institute alone
or jointly with other professional or
nonprofit institutions or government
agencies;3
In regard to the power of the ALl Council to control the
publications of the ALI, Bylaw Article V states:
1. No restatement, model code, or
recommended revision of the law shall be published
as representing the position of the Institute unless
authorized by the membership of the Institute and
approved by the Council. Use of the name of the
Institute in connection with other publications may be
preliminary ALl proposal that a year later was abandoned by the
Reporters. That example illustrates the influence the ALl
commentary on the law can have on the judiciary.
Id. at 75-76 (footnotes omitted).
See generally ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 49-60.
2 See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
30 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, TIS IS THE AmERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (1991).
31 ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 51.
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authorized by the Council without specific approval of
their contents by the membership or the Council.
2. The Council may establish procedures for
carrying out the provisions of this Bylaw, and shall
have final authority to interpret and apply it with
respect to all publications sponsored by or made in
the name of the Institute.32
In order to reshape the common law into the desired philosophical
image of the ALI, the proper choice of reporter for each ALI project
is absolutely required."
ALI Council Rules unconditionally grant the power to the
Director, with the approval of the Council or the Executive
Committee, to select the appropriate ALI projects' Reporters,
"reviewing advisors," consultants, and research assistants to carry out
the legal philosophy of the Council in the following language:
V. Reporters, Advisers and Advisory Committees,
Consultants, and Assistants
1. Each project of the Institute shall be in
32 Id. at 53.
11 The vital importance of selecting the "right" reporters for a certain ALl project
is illustrated by the discussion in James F. Hogg, Tinkering with Successive Drafts Will
Not Change the Reporters' Philosophy, in THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 23 (Phillip D. Mink, Esq. ed.,
National Legal Center for the Public Interest 1987).
Major thrusts of the Reporters' philosophy then, are
unnecessary, unworkable, threaten the continued existence and
function of the independent outside director, and are wasteful of
corporate assets and management energies. Annual attempts to
address these philosophic problems through tinkering, wordsmithing,
or amendments offered from the floor, may not do them justice. It
may be time to consider again a recommendation that the project be
tabled or referred back for basic and fundamental revision.
Moreover, persistence with the Project along present lines in face of
the degree of controversy noted, could begin to tarnish a corner of
the ALI's prestige - a prestige of priceless value.
Id. at 68 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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charge of a reporter or reporters employed by the
Director with the approval of the Council or the
Executive Committee.
2. The Director may, with the approval of the
Council or the Executive Committee, appoint advisers
to review the preliminary drafts of a reporter prior to
their submission to the Council.
3. The Director may employ consultants and
assistants to aid a reporter in the preparation of
material for the Institute or may authorize the reporter
to employ research assistants. 4
Additionally, to control the philosophical content of the
several Restatements of the Law and other publications issued in its
name, the ALI Council, acting through its Director and Executive
Committee, has absolute authority to determine which publications
the membership may consider for review." It may safely be stated
34 ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 59.
s The relevant publication rule provides as follows:
The general procedure for the preparation and authorization
of publications of restatements or recommended revisions of the law
in the name of the Institute, pursuant to Section V of the Bylaws,
shall be as follows:
1. Material intended for publication shall first
be submitted to the Council, and by it to the
members.
2. The Council may submit the material to the
membership with or without its approval,
amendment, or recommendations.
3. The membership may approve, reject, or
amend any matter submitted by the Council and
may authorize the Council to make such changes
as the Council deems proper.
4. The Council shall make or authorize such
final editorial or other revisions as it deems
appropriate and shall determine the form, time,
and manner of publication.
5. No publication using the name of the Institute
shall be made without the authorization of the
Council.
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that the underlying legal philosophy of the various ALI publications
is controlled by the ALI President, ALI Director, and Executive
Committee; together they share the unfettered discretion to employ
the "right" reporter with the "right" legal philosophy, in order to
obtain the "right" result.3 6
Pursuant to Bylaw Article III, sections (1)(a-h) and Bylaw
Article V, sections (1) and (2), the ALI Council is granted complete
and effective control over the publications and affairs of the ALI.37
However, pursuant to Rules of Council IIA,38 I1(3)," 9 and II(7),4"
Id. at 60.
3'6 See id.
37 ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 51, 53.
38 Id. at 58. Rule IIA states:
There shall be an Executive Committee of the Council
consisting of the President, the Vice-Presidents, the Treasurer, and
ten members of the Council elected by the Council. The Executive
Committee shall have and exercise the authority and powers of the
Council in all matters except those as to which the Bylaws or action
of the Council require action by the Council.
Id.
Id. at 57. Rule 1I(3) reads as follows:
The President shall be the chief executive officer of the
Institute and shall in general supervise and direct all of its business
and affairs. He shall preside at all meetings of the Institute and of
the Council. He shall have authority, with or without the signature
of the Secretary or any other officer as determined by the Council
or as required by law, to sign on behalf of the Institute all contracts,
deeds, or other instruments.
Id.
o ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 58. Rule 111(7) states:
The Director shall be responsible for directing the work of
the Institute. He shall attend all meetings of the Institute, the
Council, and the Executive Committee and shall preside at such
meetings in the absence of the President or a Vice-President. He
shall also attend, if practicable, and in the absence of the President,
preside at all conferences of reporters, advisers, and consultants
respecting the work of the Institute.
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and as a matter of practice, the publications and the daily affairs of
the ALI are conducted by ALI President Roswell B. Perkins and ALI
Director Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. in accordance with the power
granted to them.41
The state and federal courts often adopt as law in the trial of
actual cases the ALI "Restatement of the Law" and ALl Codifications
of the Law, i.e. Uniform Commercial Code,42 without independent
analysis or reflection.43 Thus, for all practical purposes, the Harvard-
Yale connection of ALl President Roswell B. Perkins and ALI
Director Geoffrey C. Hazard controls the restatement and the new
statement of the common law in the state and federal courts of the
United States.
To further illustrate the tremendous power of the ALI
President, ALI Director, and ALI Council in reshaping the common
law of this nation in their own image, the rules relating to the
admission of elected membership to the ALI must be examined.'
The rules establish difficult admissions standards to limit the
membership to only those desired. Thus, it is clear that gaining
Id.
41 See supra notes 39 and 40.
42 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 15 (listing the number of times that state
and federal courts have cited the various ALl Restatements and Codifications).
'" See Compagnie Des Bauxites v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 724 F.2d 369 (3d Cir.
1983) (finding that the district court erred in not adopting the Restatement of Contracts
definition of "a fortuitous event"). See also Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee v.
Insurance Co. of N. An., No. 83-5476 (3d Cir. 1984) (relying on the finding in
Compagnie Des Bauxites v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 724 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1983)).
The rules state:
1. The membership of the Institute shall be the members in good
standing at the close of the annual meeting in May, 1971.
Additional and succeeding members of all classes shall be elected by
the Council in accordance with qualifications and procedures
proscribed by it, subject to the provisions of these Bylaws.
2. The membership shall be composed primarily of elected members,
the number of whom shall be fixed by the Council from time to time
but shall not exceed two thousand five hundred. The Council may
establish and fix the terms and conditions of one or more additional
classes of membership.
ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 49 (emphasis added).
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admission to the ALI as an elected member is very difficult and
circumscribed.4"
The elected members are not permitted to exceed more than
two thousand five hundred in number." The method of selecting
elected members of the ALl is instructive. The relevant sections read
as follows:
5. There shall be a standing Committee on
Membership consisting of not less than five members
of the Council, to be appointed annually by the
President, the duties and authority of which shall be
prescribed by the Council.
6. No person shall become an elected member of the
Institute unless he shall have been proposed in writing
by a member and seconded in writing by two
members, and recommended by the Committee on
Membership. The Council may impose additional
requirements for membership.47
In order to better control the ultimate election of the ALI
Council members, the general membership is divided into classes of
elected members, 48 ex officio members, 49 and life members."0 It is
4 See id. at 54-56.
4 Id. at 49.
41 Id. at 50.
, Id. at 54. The relevant rule states:
1. Elected Members
a. Elected members shall be chosen by the Councilfor life, subject
to termination or transfer to special classes in accordance with the
Bylaws or these rules.
b. A new member may be proposed and elected only if proposed in
writing by a member and seconded in writing by at least two
members and recommended by the Committee on Membership.
Id. (emphasis added).
49 ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 54. The relevant rule states:
2. Ex Officio Members
a. The Chief Justice of the United States and the Associate Justices
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to be noted that with the exception of ex officio membership, one
cannot force the ALI to accept himself or herself into membership as
a matter of course and/or by force of law.5" A possible new member
can gain elected membership only by following the procedure
outlined by ALI Council Rule I(A)(1)(b) as set forth above.52
It is clear that elected membership in the ALI is not open to
of the Supreme Court of the United States, Chief Judges of the
United States Courts of Appeals, and Chief Justices of the highest
court of each State if elected or appointed as such for life, shall be
members for life.
b. The following shall be members during the terms of their offices:
(1) The Chief Justice of the highest court of each state.
(2) The Attorney General and the Solicitor General of the
United States.
(3) The Presidents of American, National and Federal Bar
Associations, the District of Columbia, and each State Bar
Association, and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
(4) The Dean of each law school which is a member of the
Association of American Law Schools and the President of
that Association.
c. The Council shall prescribe the procedures for invitation or
application for ex officio membership and may provide for admission
to or continuance in ex officio membership of other individuals or
classes of persons.
d. The Council may elect honorary members of the Institute.
Id.
I d. at 55. The relevant rule states:
3. Life Members
Elected members of twenty-five years standing are eligible to be life
members. At each annual meeting the twenty-five eligible members
who have been elected members for the greatest number of years, or
such larger number of such members as the Council may determine,
shall become life members. Life members shall possess all rights
and privileges of an elected member for life, but shall not be
obligated to pay dues or to conform to the participation rule; but a
life member who pays the regular dues which such person paid as an
elected member shall be a sustaining life member.
Id.
S! See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 54.
52 See supra note 48.
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all who wish to belong. To the contrary, the above referred to ALI
Council Rule I(A)(1)(b) regarding elected membership creates further
difficulty for an aspiring member because of the requirement of ALI
Council Rule I(D) and Rule II(D) concerning the required action by
the Committee on Membership. These rules state, respectively:
D. Admission to Membership
All applications or proposals for membership of any
class, except honorary and ex officio members, shall
first be referred to the Committee on Membership,
and no person shall be elected to membership unless
the Committee's recommendation as to his election
has been presented to the Council. 3
D. Committee on Membership
There shall be a Committee on Membership consisting
of five members of the Council, appointed by the
President. All proposals or applications for
membership in the Institute, except ex officio, and all
requests or suggestions for termination or
reclassification of membership, shall first be referred
to the Committee, which shall make its
recommendations to the Council. s'
An unspoken requirement of the ALI membership process
seems to be that a potential member, in order to be elected, should
be a graduate of Harvard or Yale Law School.55 At a bare minimum,
the applicant should have attended a law school on or east of the
Mississippi River Basin such as the University of Chicago, the
53 ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 55-56.
s Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
" See infra Appendix One, at 99. The "Eastern Establishment" is in firm control
of the Restatements of the common law in this country. Out of a total of 204 law
schools existing in the United States as of 1990 (175 ABA accredited schools, 29
unaccredited) only 18 have graduates who are ALl Council Members (56 in total) and
two law schools have a total of 34 Council Members (21 members are graduates of
Harvard and 13 members are graduates of Yale). A total of 186 law schools out of 204
existing law schools in the United States do not have graduates who have membership
on the ALI Council, the controlling organ of ALl. See id.
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University of Virginia, the University of Minnesota, Duke
University, New York University, Columbia University, the
University of Pennsylvania, Indiana University, or the University of
Wisconsin. Only four law schools west of the Mississippi River
Basin have graduates who are also currently members of the ALl
Council.56
In order to perpetuate the power of the "Harvard-Yale
Connection" for many years into the future, the ALI Council is
divided into three classes and elected at intervals of three years.57
This staggered term method of electing members enables the Council
members to keep a tight grip on how the ALI is operated. As a
result, in the fall of 1990 ALI President Roswell B. Perkins, a
graduate of Harvard Law School, and ALl Director Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., a professor of law at Yale Law School and a graduate
of Columbia University Law School, were safely entrenched in their
respective positions.
Several minor and statistically insignificant changes have
occurred in the composition of the membership of the ALl Council
since the autumn of 1990. These changes have had no adverse effect
of any kind on the exercise of power of ALl President Perkins and
ALI Director Hazard to absolutely and without interference control
the daily operation of the ALI.5" Instead of a council of fifty-five
members, as was the case prior to the 1990 ALl Annual Meeting,59
the ALL now has a Council of fifty-six members who are divided into
three almost equal classes. 60
The term of the first class of ALl Council members expires
at the annual meeting to be held in 1992 and has seventeen currently
assigned ALl Council members.61 Out of that number, eleven ALl
5' The four members are Philip S. Anderson, University of Arkansas, Hans A.
Linde, University of California, George Whittenberg, University of Texas, and William
M. Burke, Stanford University. See infra Appendix One, at 99.
S7 ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 54.
-" Compare THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ANNUAL REPORTS 63-65 (1990)
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORTS Il] with ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 61-63
(comparing the composition of membership of the ALT Council in 1990 and 1991).
59 ANNUAL REPORTS II, supra note 58, at 63-64.
60 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 61-62; reproduced infra Appendix Two,
at 101.
61 ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 61, reproduced infra Appendix Two, at 101.
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Council members graduated from Harvard and Yale (eight from
Harvard, three from Yale) and the remaining six ALI Council
members attended other law schools.62
The term of the second class of ALI Council members expires
at the annual meeting to be held in 1995 and has eighteen currently
assigned ALI Council members.63 Out of that number, ten ALI
Council Members graduated from Harvard and Yale (four from
Harvard, six from Yale) and the remaining eight ALI Council
members attended other law schools.'
The term of the third class of ALI Council Members expires
at the annual meeting to be held in 1998 and has eighteen currently
assigned ALI Council members.65 Out of that number, twelve ALI
Council members graduated from Harvard and Yale (seven from
Harvard, five from Yale) and the remaining five ALI Council
members attended other law schools.'
Two of the present members of the ALI Council, William
Burke, a graduate of Stanford University Law School, and Christine
M. Durham, a graduate of Duke University Law School, were
elected to interim terms on the ALI Council in October of 1989.67
They were later elected to regular terms on the ALl Council at the
ALI 1990 Annual Meeting. Mr. Burke was assigned to the Second
Class, expiring in 1995.68 Ms. Durham was assigned to the Third
Class, expiring in 1998.69
Evidence of how the "Harvard-Yale Connection" continues to
effectively control the ALl Council is obvious. Out of a present total
of fifty-six Council Members, nineteen attended Harvard Law School
and fifteen attended Yale Law School.7" The remaining twenty-two
2 See infra Appendix One, at 99.
6 ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 61-62, reproduced infra Appendix Two, at
101.
See infra Appendix One, at 99.
6 ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 62, reproduced infra Appendix Two, at 101.
See infra Appendix One, at 99.
7 ANNUAL REPORTS II, supra note 58, at 64.
ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 61.
Id. at 62. Carolyn Dineen King, who became a member of the ALI Council in
1991, had not been assigned to a class as of time of publication.
70 See infra Appendix One, at 99.
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Council members attended sixteen other law schools.71 As previously
noted, each of the elected AL Council members is assigned to one
of the three classes of ALI Council members for a term of nine years
(either to the class of 1992, 1995, or 1998) which assures the
"Harvard-Yale Connection" absolute domination and control of the
ALI Council for at least a period of nine years and probably eighteen
years into the future.72 If the past history of ALI Council elections
are an indication of the future, the AL President will be from
Harvard and the* Director will be from Yale for at least nine
additional years and probably into the foreseeable future.
As further protection for the incumbent ALI Council against
any attempt by anyone to wrest control of the ALI, Bylaw VI,
concerning the "Amendment of Bylaws," makes it virtually
impossible to democratize the ALI by making it a representative body
properly reflecting all social, economic, and political segments of this
country. Bylaw VI reads as follows:
These Bylaws may be amended by a majority of the
members voting on the question at a meeting of
members, or by a majority of the members by written
ballot. No proposed amendment shall be submitted
for a vote of the members of the Institute unless
recommended by a majority of members of the
Council, or proposed by at least seventy-five elected
members of the Institute after being first submitted to
the Council in writing. If the proposal is not
recommended by a majority of the Council, it shall on
request of the sponsors be submitted to the members
of the Institute at the next annual meeting after its
submission to the Council.73
Action on a proposed amendment to the Bylaws can be
postponed for at least one year automatically,74 and in any event, if
the proposed amendment is not recommended by a majority of the
71 Id.
' See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 51.
7 Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
74 Id.
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ALl Council or by at least seventy-five elected members, the
amendment, if opposed, will clearly fail.75
III. The ALl Council is Elitist and Unrepresentative of the
Social and Economic Interests of the American People
The ALI Council is an elitist, unrepresentative group of
people who are unlawfully restating and reformulating the common
law of the United States, acting through selected and privately
supervised unaccountable ALI reporters and advisors. The economic
and social interests of the masses of individual citizens are not in any
way properly represented in this restatement process.76 Likewise,
representative political entities, such as Congress and the state
legislatures, have no input in this restatement process. 77
The question now arises as to the identity of these ALI
Council members and whose social and economic interests they in
fact represent. The ALI Council now has fifty-six members, all of
whom are lawyers.78 The occupational breakdown of the present ALI
Council membership is as follows:
5 Id.
76 The internal operational format of the ALI ordinarily does not allow for any input
of relevant ideas from non-member individuals, from non-member entities, from
Congress, or from the state legislatures. The ALI, for example, has entered into
cooperation agreements with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in regard to updating the Uniform Commercial Code, with the Permanent
Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code, also in regard to updating the
Uniform Commercial Code, and with the American Bar Association Committee on
Continuing Professional Education. See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 149-67.
Except for these limited instances, the ALI Council approves a project on a
particular area of the law. See, e.g., id. at 3-4 (discussing the ALI study on Enterprise
Responsibility for Personal Injury). Reporters are appointed by the ALI to draft
proposals and a larger group of consultants and advisers are appointed to guide the
Reporters. Id. at 59 (ALI By-laws § 5). The overwhelming percentage of advisors are
attorneys, law professors, or judges, rather than social scientists such as economists. See
id. at 65-114 (listing of Project Staffs). The Reporters then submit tentative revised
drafts of the law until the ALI finally settles on a "Restatement" of the particular area
of law. See id. at 59. It is thus clear that the general public and the legislatures of the
several states and Congress are frozen out of the Restatement process.
7 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
"See infra Appendix Three, at 103.
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-- Nine members are presently law professors.
-- Sixteen members are presently judges on the bench or
retired judges.
-- Fourteen members are presently partners in America's one
hundred highest grossing law firms.
-- Nine members are in intermediate size law firms, with
fifty to two hundred partners and associates.
-- None of the ALI Council members are in firms with
twenty-five to fifty partners.
-- Four members are in firms with fewer than twenty-five
partners.
-- Three members are in non-judicial public service.
-- Two members are corporate general counsel.79
There are no sociologists, economists, accountants, political
scientists, bankers, stockbrokers, insurance executives, corporate
chief executive officers, engineers, or penologists represented on the
ALl Council,"0 even though ALI publications are of significant social
and economic importance."1
The gender makeup of the Council is unbalanced; there are
only nine women, the remaining forty-seven Council members are
men.82 Statistics of the residential distribution of the ALI Council
members indicate that twenty-six states do not have any resident ALI
Council members.8 3 Thus, millions of people who do not have any
ALl Council members from their state are unrepresented.
There are ten ALl Council Members residing in the State of
New York," a state with a population of approximately eighteen
million people. 5 In contrast, California has approximately thirty
79 Id.
'o See id.
1 See Priest, supra note 2, at 2302 (discussing the impact of the adoption of the
Restatement (second) of Torts § 402A on American tort law).
'2 See infra Appendix One, at 99.
'3 Although 26 states do not have representation, residents of the District of
Columbia and the Virgin Islands are represented on the council. ANNUAL REPORTS,
supra note 1, at 61-62, reproduced infra Appendix Two, at 101.
" See infra Appendix Two, at 101.
85 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
1990 24 (110th ed. 1991)
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million people 6 but only three ALl Council members. 7 In summary,
it can be fairly concluded that the ALI Council membership is both
elitist and unrepresentative. 8 There are no members of the ALl
Council who would have the natural proclivity to protect the social
and economic interests of the middle class, the blue collar working
class, or the ethnic minorities, with the possible exception of the four
ALl Council members who are lawyers in very small law firms with
fewer than twenty-five partners and associates.8 9
IV. State and Federal Courts of this Nation have Surrendered
Much of Their Judicial Power to the ALl
The ALI Council is a privately controlled unrepresentative
body which has unlawfully usurped much of the power of the state
and federal courts of this nation. There is little doubt that the courts
of this nation have surrendered to the ALL their inherent common law
judicial power to state, restate, and reformulate the legal principles
that must be used and applied by courts in the course of litigating
various cases and controversies in this nation's judicial system.
The ALl 1990 Annual Reports states, "[i]t is gratifying to
know the range of our audience for the Restatement, as evidenced by
a recent colloquy in the Supreme Court in which Justice Scalia asked:
'If we can't rely on established common law or the ALI, where do
we search?"" The answer to Justice Scalia's rhetorical question is
for the trial judge to address the matter of searching for the "answer"
to a specific novel legal question in the same manner as common law
judges have always done in the past four hundred years. Judges have
traditionally reached decisions by weighing suggested solutions set
forth in the parties' briefs and by drawing on their own legal
knowledge and life experiences generally, to fashion a legal rule that
will be fair, just, and equitable, and will keep with sound public
Mid.
87 See infra Appendix Two, at 101.
U See infra Appendix Three, at 103.
n9 See infra Appendix Four, at 105.
0 ANNUAL REPORTS II, supra note 58, at 3.
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policy as the trial judge views it." If the decision is reviewed on
appeal, the appellate court will ultimately address the trial judge's
decision and will approve, reverse, modify, and/or restate its view on
the novel legal issue, usually without disturbing the trial court's
findings of fact.92
Since the inception of the ALl in 1923, state and federal
courts have looked to the ALl for guidance in interpreting and
applying the common law in 143,737 instances.93 These statistics
reveal that the state and federal courts have surrendered to the ALI,
an oligarchical organization, their traditional common law power to
address and formulate answers to unsettled, novel, common law
problems that have arisen in the courts of a democratic form of
government.
Presumably because of the ALI's success in usurping the
power of the courts of this nation to formulate the common law, the
ALI began a Corporate Governance Project in 1978.1" The effect of
the Corporate Governance Project was to expand and enlarge ALI's
immense unchecked and unaccountable power by writing a new set
of legal rules for governing the many thousands of the nation's
publicly held corporations, involving much of the nation's readily
transferable wealth in an amount of over fourteen trillion dollars in
assets. 9"
In the eyes of many leaders in the corporate business world,
the ALl Corporate Governance Project threatened the continuing
existence of many long-standing and accepted legal rules for
91 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 28 (1921).
'2 The most common form of appellate review is deference to the trial court.
Findings of the trial judge which are discretionary are usually left undisturbed. See F.
JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 677-80 (1977), reprinted in RICHARD H.
FIELD, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 1213-20 (5th ed. 1984).
93 ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 15.
" Nicholas Wolfson, The Theoretical and Empirical Failing of the American Law
Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, in THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 69, 76 (Phillip D. Mink, Esq.
ed., National Legal Center for the Public Interest 1987).
' BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
525 (110th ed. 1991).
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governing the wealth and operations of business corporations.' As
a result, a tremendous barrage of public criticism was aimed at this
"Project. "97 For the first time in ALI history, serious questions were
raised concerning the legality of the oligarchical ALI's existence in
a democratic society."
One commentator states his newly found apprehension as to
the legal efficacy of the hallowed ALl as follows:
Why has its Corporate Governance Project
encountered such widespread and intense criticism?
The Project has been a subject of controversy and
criticism since the earliest drafts. Two underlying
factors have certainly contributed to this Project's
difficulties. One is the ALI's departure from its
long-standing tradition of not using the Restatement
format to try to change or "reform" case law. This
Project proposes to urge courts to adopt its proposed
rule or "principles" as the drafts call them. Thus, it
is not a Restatement in the classic ALl tradition, nor
is it a model or uniform draft statute like the Uniform
Commercial Code, for legislatures to consider in the
usual legislative process.
The other contributing factor is the nature of some
of the "reforms" that have influenced the drafts.
They originated in some academically inspired
schemes for changing the legal rules concerning
corporate governance. Some were incorporated in the
original draft of the Project. Though since modified,
their influence continues ...
The original draft provoked such a barrage of
criticism that the ALI has abandoned it and has in
6 See William Wemple, Introduction to THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE xiii (Phillip D. Mink, Esq. ed.,
National Legal Center for the Public Interest 1987).
97Id.
' See Walter B. Wriston, "Risk," The American Law Institute, and the Corporate
Director, in THE AMEICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; AN
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 7 (Phillip D. Mink, Esq. ed., National Legal Center for the
Public Interest 1987).
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later drafts been retreating to a significant extent from
those original hard and fast positions as to what the
rules for corporate governance ought to be. But the
drafts continue to reflect substantial and troublesome
influences from the initial concept."
Walter B. Wriston, former CEO of Citicorp and Citibank,
N.A. , "takes off his kid gloves" and challenges the legality of the
entire concept of allowing the privately operated ALI to be used as
a quasi-governmental force for restating or creating law in a
democratic society:
The American Law Institute seems to have
dedicated itself to the belief that risk is a four-letter
word. . .. [T]he ALI should examine itself and its
processes. Are efforts being made to make law
without the benefit of legislation? Is the democratic
process unsuitable to make laws? Should the law be
mandated by Reporters who have had no real business
experience and whose writings reveal a lack of
understanding of the underlying dynamics of a free
enterprise society? . . . It seems particularly
unfortunate that, at a time when it is becoming
increasingly difficult to find qualified directors to
serve because our legal system has caused the
unavailability of D&O insurance, the Reporters should
talk about imposing additional liability on directors.
No other country in the world does this. . . . A
government of laws and not of men is the bedrock of
our democratic society. Many years ago, the
Founding Fathers, tired of the fiats of kings,
determined that laws in our country would be made
by the legislators elected by the people. No provision
was made for private groups, no matter what their
credentials, to by-pass this process to create their own
law. For a private group to codify existing law is one
SId.
10 Id. at xiii.
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thing; to attempt to write new law is another. Those
who truly respect the law will stick to .the
constitutional process, not run around it."10
It is disturbing to know that the United States Supreme Court
is now directly relying upon and is placing its imprimatur of approval
upon the ALI's Restatement of Torts (Second) as the official
Restatement of the common law. of defamation in the course of
interpreting the scope of the First Amendment protection to be
accorded to defamation defendants." ° The matter of determining
o10 Id. at 13-14.
102 All of the United States Supreme Court Justices are ex officio and voting
members of the ALI. ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 54-55. In Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990), the Supreme Court improperly surrendered
to the ALI its non-delegable power to interpret the constitutional common law of this
nation. The Court stated:
Defamation law developed not only as a means of allowing an
individual to vindicate his good name, but also for the purpose of
obtaining redress for harm caused by such statements. As the
common law developed in this country, apart from the issue, of
damages, one usually needed only allege an unprivileged publication
of false and defamatory matter to state a cause of action for
defamation. See, e. g., Restatement of Torts § 558 (1938) .
The common law generally did not place any additional restrictions
on the type of statement that could be actionable. Indeed,
defamatory communications were deemed actionable regardless of
whether they were deemed to be statements of fact or opinion. See,
e.g., Restatement of Torts, supra, §§ 565-567.... However, due
to concerns that unduly burdensome defamation laws could stifle
valuable public debate, the privilege of "fair comment" was
incorporated into the common law as an .affirmative defense to an
action for defamation. "The principle of 'fair comment' afford[ed]
legal immunity for the honest expression of opinion on matters of
legitimate public interest when based upon a true or privileged
statement of fact." As this statement implies, comment was
generally privileged when it concerned a matter of public concern,
was upon true or privileged facts, represented the actual opinion of
the speaker, and was not made solely for the purpose of causing
harm. . . . Thus under the common law, the privilege of "fair
comment" was the device employed to strike the appropriate balance
between the need for vigorous public discourse and the need to
redress injury to citizens wrought by invidious or irresponsible
speech.
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what is the common law of defamation in order to construe the First
Amendment of the Constitution should under no conceivable
circumstances be surrendered to the privately controlled ALI. It is
indeed alarming to find that the United States Supreme Court, in its
several precedential references to the Restatement of Torts (Second)
in the Milkovich case1"3 has surrendered to the ALL the Supreme
Court's Constitutional non-delegable power to define the common law
limits of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. t °"
A clear example of judicially created common law, using only
the ALI Restatement as precedent, is a case that was heard in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; Campagnie Des
Bauxites v. Insurance Company of North America ("Tippler-Crusher
case").1 °5 This case involved a design defect in a Tippler-Crusher
house that led to a business interruption.'06 The question presented
was whether the design defect that led to the business interruption
was as a matter of law a "fortuitous event."10 7 The answer to the
question presented depended upon how the court defined said term.
A panel of three ALI member circuit judges, without citing
one relevant common law precedent, 0 8 and after expressly rejecting
all discussion of the public policy issues raised by the district judge
Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2702-03 (citations omitted).
"o Id. at 2702, 2706, and 2710.
,o' U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
105 724 F.2d 369 (1983).
'06 Id. at 370.
o Id. at 372.
1W An entire law review article could be written about the Tippler-Crusher case and
about the companion case, Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Insurance Co. of N.
Am., No. 83-5476 (3d Cir. 1984) (the "Bucket-Wheel" case). The author of this paper
was the district judge in the district court in both cases. The circuit panel, in the
Tippler-Crusher case, cited only one Pennsylvania case in support of its position, namely
Panizzi v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 386 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1967). By an
unusual coincidence, the author of this paper was the attorney for the plaintiff in the
Panizzi case, and this author does certify that the history of Panizzi supports the
proposition that there was no issue ever in the Panizzi case concerning the definition of
the term "fortuitous event." Clearly the automobile accident in Panizzi (the death of
Mrs. Gedeon) under any definition was a "fortuitous event" and the main question in the
case was whether the insurance policy was in force at the time the event occurred. Id.
at 602-03.
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in the district court below,"° unanimously adopted the definition of
the term "fortuitous event" set forth in the Restatement of Contracts
(First), § 291, Comment (a) (1932).11o The circuit panel expressly
declined to follow the English and American case law to the
contrary.," Not surprisingly, the circuit court of appeals judges who
sat in the Tippler-Crusher case were Judge Seitz, Judge Gibbons, and
Judge Rosenn, all members of the ALI." 2
A second example of three ALI member judges sitting as a
panel on the United States Court of Appeals while adopting the work
product of the ALl is the companion case to the Tippler-Crusher
case, Compagnie Des Bauxites v. Insurance Company of North
America ("Bucket-Wheel case").11 The Bucket Wheel case is an
unpublished opinion that likewise followed the law first enunciated in
the Tippler-Crusher case and in the Restatement of Contracts (First),
§ 291, Comment (a) (1932).114 The Bucket-Wheel Court also
specifically rejected both English and American common law in
reversing the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania. 1 5 This case involved a design defect in a bucket-wheel
mechanism that led to a business interruption.11 6 The circuit court of
appeals judges who sat in the Bucket-Wheel case, and who are also
members of the ALI, are Judge Adams, Judge Becker, and Judge
'o Campagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 724 F.2d at 371.
Io ld. at 372.
". It is interesting to note that the court in the Tippler-Crusher case did not cite the
Restatement of Contracts (Second) as controlling authority even though it had been
adopted May 17, 1979, well before the 1983 Appeals decision in the Tippler-Crusher
case. For public policy reasons, the plaintiff in the Tippler-Crusher case could never
have recovered at common law. See Greene v. Cheetham, 293 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1965);
Mellon v. Federal Ins. Co., 14 F.2d 997 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
112 ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 125, 139, and 141.
"I Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., No. 83-5476 (3d
Cir. 1984).
114 Id.
"l 566 F. Supp. 258 (1983).
116 Compagniedes Bauxites de Guineev. Insurance Co. of N. Am., No. 83-5476 (3d
Cir. 1984). In this 1984 decision, the court followed the binding decision of the Court
of Appeals of the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit had adopted the Restatement of
Contracts' definition of 'fortuitous event,' holding that under Pennsylvania law accidents
that are caused by unknown design defects are 'fortuitous events.' Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 724 F.2d 369, 372 (1983).
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The six appellate judges, all active ALI members, who sat on
the Tippler-Crusher case and the companion Bucket-Wheel case
surrendered their judicial power to the ALI. These judges blindly
adopted the untested ALI definition of "fortuitous event" set forth in
the Restatement of Contracts (First) § 291, Comment (a) (1932).
This definition was accepted without any independent written court
opinion or analysis of the important public policy issues raised in
these cases. The action taken by these judges circumvented the
traditional role of the judiciary, thus undermining the legal system.
V. Conclusion
The ALI is a privately controlled corporation which has been
permitted by the courts and legislatures of this nation to assume
quasi-governmental functions. This is especially troubling in light of
the fact that the ALI is wielding their enormous power in a manner
unmatched by any other private person or legal entity.
Although the aims and intentions of the ALI may be
praiseworthy, the practical effect of its ingeniously contrived
corporate organization is to undemocratically vest immeasurable
unfettered, unchecked, and unaccountable quasi-judicial and
quasi-legislative power into the hands of the very few elitist people
who control the ALI."' Because the ALI is elitist in style, it is not
accountable to any governmental authority of any kind, and is not
subject to any of the usual constitutional checks and balances that are
applied to the various divisions of state and federal governments. 9
117 ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 1, at 115, 117, and 140.
11 See infra Appendix Three, at 103.
19 See William M. Millard, Eroding the Separation of Powers: Congressional
Encroachment on Federal Judicial Power: CFTC v. Schor, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 669
(1987) (doctrine of checks and balances gives each branch of government the ability to
restrain the actions of its co-equal branches). "The Constitution delegates to the Judicial
branch the power to review government actions and to invalidate such actions if contrary
to the Constitution." Id. at 670 (citing Maryeilen Fullerton, No Light at the End of the
Pipeline: Confision SurroundsLegislative Courts, 49 BROOK. L. REv. 207,208 (1983));
See also Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on
Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U. L. REv. 59 (1983) (explaining Congress' concern
with checking possible power abuse of the Executive branch).
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The continued existence of the privately operated ALI as an
unaccountable quasi-governmental entity compromises this nation's
democratic form of government. As a result, the liberty and freedom
of all of the citizens of this country are clearly threatened by the
various aforementioned activities which have been undemocratically
promulgated by the ALI. Under these circumstances, the active state
and federal judges of this nation, by law, should be forever denied
membership in the private elitist ALI, and ALI publications should
not be given precedential effect in any court proceeding unless or
until the ALI has been democratized.
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APPENDIX ONE*
LIST OF ALl COUNCIL MEMBERS
BY LAW SCHOOL ATTENDED
LAW SCHOOL:
1. Harvard University
2. Yale University
3. Columbia University
COUNCIL MEMBER:
1. Richard S. Arnold
2. Michael Traynor
3. Bennett Boskey
4. Michael Boudin
5. William T. Coleman, Jr.
6. Erwin N. Griswold
7. James H. Wilson, Jr.
8. Vincent R. McKusick
9. Ernest J. Sargeant
10. Herbert P. Wilkins
11. Edward H. Cooper
12. Conrad K. Harper
13. Pierre N. Leval
14. Robert MacCrate
15. Roswell B. Perkins
16. Hugh Calkins
17. Robert H. Mundheim
18. John W. Wade
19. Vester T. Hughes, Jr.
1. John P. Frank **
2. Ellen Ash Peters
3. Lloyd M. Cutler
4. Betsy Levin
5. Patricia Wald
6. Gerhard Casper
7. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
8. Louis H. Pollak
9. John T. Subak
10. Charles Alan Wright
11. Frank M. Wozencraft
12. George Clemon Freeman, Jr.
13. Edward Hirsch Levi ***
14. Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr.
15. Carolyn Dineen King
1. Ruth Bader Ginsberg
2. Sherwin P. Simmons
3. Herbert Wechsler
4. Lawrence E. Walsh
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4. University of Chicago
5. University of Wisconsin
6. New York University
7. University of Arkansas
8. University of Virginia
9. University of Florida
10. University of Minnesota
11. Duke University
12. University of California
13. University of Pennsylvania
14. University of Texas
15. Indiana University
16. Washington University
17. Stanford University
18. Villanova University
Herma Hill Kay
Edward Hirsch Levi ***
Roger C. Cramton
John P. Frank **
Thomas E. Fairchild
Sheila L. Birnbaum
Martin Lipton
Philip S. Anderson
William H. Erickson
William Reece Smith, Jr.
Robert A. Stein
Hale McCown
Christine M. Durham
Hans A. Linde
Bernard G. Segal
George Whittenburg
Shirley S. Abrahamson
William H. Webster
William M. Burke
George H.T. Dudley
* Abstracted from AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, THIS IS THE AMERIcAN LAW INSTITUTE
(1991).
** Received L.L.B. University of Wisconsin; J.S.D. Yale University.
*** Received J.D. University of Chicago; J.S.D. Yale University.
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Member
Phillip S. Anderson
Sheila L. Birnbaum
Hugh Calkins
William T. Coleman, Jr.
Conrad K. Harper
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Pierre N. Leval
Hans A. Linde
Robert MacCrate
Hale McCown
Roswell B. Perkins
Ernest J. Sargeant
Sherwin P. Simmons
John T. Subak
John M. Wade
Patricia M. Wald
Herbert Wechsler
Place of Residence
Little Rock, Ark.
New York, N.Y.
Cleveland, Ohio
Washington, D.C.
New York, N.Y.
Armonk, N.Y.
New York, N.Y.
Salem, Or.
New York, N.Y.
Lincoln, Neb.
New York, N.Y.
Boston, Mass.
Tampa, Fla.
Philadelphia, Pa.
Nashville, Tenn.
Washington, D.C.
New York, N.Y.
Term Expiring at ANNUAL MEETING 1995
Shirley S. Abrahamson
Richard Sheppard Arnold
Bennett Boskey
Gerhard Casper
Roger C. Cramton
William H. Erickson
Thomas E. Fairchild
William M. Burke
George C. Freeman, Jr.
Madison, Wis.
Little Rock, Ark.
Washington, D.C.
Chicago, Ill.
Ithaca, N.Y.
Denver, Colo.
Madison, Wis.
Los Angeles, Cal.
Richmond, Va.
Year First Elected
1982
1989
1976
1969
1986
1983
1984
1982
1975
1969
1968
1972
1986
1987
1982
1978
1984
1985
1986
1972
1980
1975
1972
1967
1972
1980
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APPENDIX TWO*
LIST OF ALI OFFICERS AND MEMBERS BY CLASS
ALl Officers
Roswell B. Perkins, President
Charles Alan Wright, 1st Vice President
Patricia M. Wald, 2d Vice President
Bennett Boskey, Treasurer
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Director
Paul A. Wolkin, Executive Vice President and Secretary
Members of the Council
Term Expiring at ANNUAL MEETING 1992
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Herma Hill Kay
Vincent L. McKusick
Ellen Ash Peters
Bernard G. Segal
Wm. Reece Smith, Jr.
Lyman M. Tondel, Jr.
Michael Traynor
William H. Webster
Frank M. Wozencraft
Charles Alan Wright
Berkeley, Cal.
Portland, Me.
Hartford, Conn.
Philadelphia, Pa.
Tampa, Fla.
New York, N.Y.
San Francisco, Cal.
Washington, D.C.
Houston, Tex.
Austin, Tex.
Term Expiring at ANNUAL MEETING 1998
Michael Boudin
Edward H. Cooper
Lloyd N. Cutler
Christine M. Durham
Jefferson B. Fordham
John P. Frank
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Erwin N. Griswold
Vester T. Hughes, Jr.
Edward Hirsch Levi
Betsy Levin
Martin Lipton
Robert H. Mundheim
Louis H. Pollak
Robert A. Stein
Lawrence E. Walsh
George Whittenburg
Herbert P. Wilkins
James H. Wilson, Jr.
Washington, D.C.
Ann Arbor, Mich.
Washington, D.C.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah
Phoenix, Ariz.
Washington, D.C.
Washington, D.C.
Dallas, Tex.
Chicago, Ill.
Boulder, Colo.
New York, N.Y.
Philadelphia, Pa.
Philadelphia, Pa.
Minneapolis, Minn.
Oklahoma City, Okla.
Amarillo, Tex.
Boston, Mass.
Atlanta, Ga.
EMERITUS COUNCIL MEMBERS
Frederick A. Ballard
F.M. Bird
Charles D. Breitel
R. Amni Cutter
Paul A. Freund
Joseph F. Johnston
Charles Merton Merrill
Lyman M. Tondel, Jr.
John Minor Wisdom
Alexandria, Va.
Atlanta, Ga.
New York, N.Y.
Cambridge, Mass.
Cambridge, Mass.
Birmingham, Ala.
San Francisco, Cal.
New York, N.Y.
New Orleans, La.
* Abstracted from THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE ANNUAL REPORTS 61-62 (1991).
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1986
1969
1984
1956
1981
1976
1985
1978
1974
1969
1980
1988
1975
1990
1969
1973
1978
1953
1966
1965
1983
1986
1985
1978
1988
1963
1989
1982
1975
1966
1949
1962
1949
1969
1950
1960
1976
1961
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APPENDIX THREE*
LIST OF ALl COUNCIL MEMBERS
BY STATE OF RESIDENCE OR OFFICE LOCATION,
LAW SCHOOL ATTENDED, AND OCCUPATION
State Member Law School Occupation
Ariz. John P. Frank W'sc./Yale (d)
Ark. Philip S. Anderson U. Ark. (M
Richard S. Arnold Harvard (b)
Cal. Herma Hill Kay U. Chi. (a)
Michael Traynor Harvard (d)
William M. Burke Stanford (c)
Colo. William H. Erickson U. Virginia (b)
Conn. Ellen Ash Peters Yale (b)
B. W. Heineman, Jr. Yale (h)
D.C. Bennett Boskey Harvard ()
Michael Boudin Harvard (b)
William T. Coleman Harvard (c)
Lloyd M. Cutler Yale (c)
Ruth B. Ginsberg Columbia (b)
Erwin N. Griswold Harvard (a)
Betsy Levin Yale (g)
Patricia M. Wald Yale (b)
William H. Webster Wash. U. (g)
Fla. Sherwin P. Simmons Columbia (d)
William R. Smith, Jr. U. Fla. (d)
Ga. James H. Wilson, Jr. Harvard (d)
Ill. Gerhard Casper Yale (a)
Edward Hirsch Levi U. Chi./Yale (a)
Me. Vincent McKusick Harvard (b)
Mass. Ernest J. Sargeant Harvard (c)
Herbert P. Wilkins Harvard (b)
Mich. Edward H. Cooper Harvard (a)
Minn. Robert A. Stein U. Minn. (d)
Neb. Hale McCown (ret'd) Duke (b)
N.J. N. deB. Katzenbach Yale (d)
N.Y. Roger C. Cramton U. Chi. (a)
Shiela L. Birnbaum NYU (c)
Conrad K. Harper Harvard (c)
Pierre N. Leval Harvard (b)
Martin Lipton NYU (c)
Robert McCrate Harvard (c)
Roswell B. Perkins Harvard (c)
Herbert Wechsler Columbia (a)
Ohio Hugh Calkins Harvard (c)
Okla. Lawrence E. Walsh Columbia (g)
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Or. Hans A. Linde U. Calif. (b)
Pa. Robert H. Mundheim Harvard (e)
Louis H. Pollak Yale (b)
Bernard G. Segal U. Penn. (c)
John T. Subak Yale (h)
Tenn. John W. Wade Harvard (d)
Tex. George Whittenburg U. Tex. (f)
Charles A. Wright Yale (a)
V. T. Hughes, Jr. Harvard (d)
Frank Wozencraft Yale (c)
Carolyn Dineen King Yale (b)
Utah Christine M. Durham Duke (b)
V.I. George H.T. Dudley Villanova (f)
Va. George Freeman, Jr. Yale (c)
Wis. Shirley Abrahamson Indiana U. (b)
Thomas E. Fairchild U. Wise. (b)
Occupation Symbols for ALl Council Members
(a) Law Professor
(b) Judge
(c) Partner in one of America's One Hundred Highest Grossing Law Firms
(d) Partner in law firm with 50 to 200 partners and associates
(e) Partner in law firm with 25 to 50 partners and associates
() Partner in law firm with 1 to 25 partners and associates
(g) Public Service other than judicial service
(h) General Counsel of business corporation
* Abstracted from Martindale Hubbel.
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APPENDIX FOUR*
LIST OF ALl COUNCIL MEMBERS ACCORDING TO LAW FIRM SIZE
America's 100 Highest Grossing Law Firms
Name State Law Firm
William M. Burke
William T. Coleman
Lloyd M. Cutler
Ernest J. Sargeant
Conrad K. Harper
Shiela L. Birnbaum
Martin Lipton
Robert MacCrate
Roswell B. Perkins
Hugh Calkins
Bernard G. Segal
Frank M. Wozencraft
George Freeman, Jr.
Robert H. Mundheim
Cal.
D.C.
D.C.
Mass.
N.Y.
N.Y.
N.Y.
N.Y.
N.Y.
Ohio
Pa.
Tex.
.D.C.
N.Y.
Shearman & Sterling
O'Melveny & Myers
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering
Ropes & Gray
Simpson & Bartlett
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen Katz
Sullivan & Cromwell
Debevoise & Plimpton
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue
Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis
Baker & Botts
Hunton & Williams
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson
Intermediate Size Law Firms 50 to 200 Partners
John P. Frank
Sherwin Simmons
William R. Smith
James H. Wilson, Jr.
Robert A. Stein
N. Katzenbach
John W. Wade
Vester T. Hughes, Jr.
Michael Traynor
Bennett Boskey
George Whittenburg
Philip S. Anderson
George H.T. Dudley
Ariz. Lewis & Roca
Fla. Trenam, Simmons, Kemker, Barkin, Frye &
O'Neill
Fla. Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith &
Cutler
Ga. Sutherland, Asbill, & Brennan
Minn. Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett
N.J. Riker, Danzig, Scherer, Hyland & Perretti
Tenn. Waller, Lansden, Portch & Davis
Tex. Hughes & Luce
Cal. Cooley, Godward, Castro, Huddleson & Tatum
Law Firms with Less Than 25 Members
D.C.
Tex.
Ark.
V.I.
Volpe, Boskey & Lyons
Conant, Whittenburg, Whittenburg & Schachter
Williams & Anderson
Dudley, Topper & Feuerzeig
*Abstracted from AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, THIS IS THE AMERICA LAW INSTITUTE
(1991); Martindale Hubbel.
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